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The slope of the sticky information Phillips curve proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) is based on 
the degree of information rigidity on the part of firms. Carroll (2003) uses an epidemiology model of 
expectations and finds evidence for the U.S. of a one-year lag in the transmission of information from 
professional forecasters to households. Using financial institutions‟ and firms‟ survey data from Peru 
and the model proposed by Carroll, I estimate the degree of information rigidity for the Peruvian 
economy.  This  paper  also  considers  heterogeneous  responses  and  explores  the  cross-sectional 
dimension of these survey forecasts. I find that the degree of information stickiness is such that it 
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During the past ten years, several papers have argued that sticky information models, in 
which agents update their information occasionally rather than instantaneously, explain some 
stylized facts about output and inflation dynamics. This research aims at estimating the slope 
of the Phillips curve, which in turn describes the relationship between inflation, economic 
activity,  and  expectations.  Having  the  correct  structural  parameters  allows  a  better 
understanding of the dynamics  of inflation, for example, in response to monetary policy 
shocks. 
Mankiw and Reis (2002, MR thereafter) pioneered the literature on sticky information 
modeling.  Their  work  was  motivated  by  the  following  stylized  facts  about  inflation 
dynamics:  (i)  monetary  policy  actions  require  some  time  to  have  their  full  impact  on 
inflation,  (ii)  there  is  a  large  and  positive  serial  correlation  in  the  inflation  process,  (iii) 
disinflation policies have contractionary effects, and (iv) monetary policy actions have their 
maximum effect on cyclical output before they have their maximum effect on inflation. MR 
proposed a structural explanation for these stylized facts based on information rigidities.
1 
The first attempt to provide microfoundations to MR‟s (2002) model was Carroll (2003) 
and his epidemiological model of expectations. Carroll argues that the U.S. survey data on 
inflation expectations is consistent with a model in which each period only a fraction of 
households adopt the superior inflation forecasts of experts. The experts‟ forecast is superior 
in the sense that they have better available information. The remaining households find it 
costly to update their information and continue using their own past expectations rather than 
forming  better  predictions.  In  this  context,  in  order  to  make  better  predictions,  an agent 
requires more time for analysis and better knowledge of other important information. Reis 
                                                 
1 See Castillo et al. (2006) for stilized facts for Peru.   3 
(2006b) also provides microfoundations for MR (2002) and argues that firms can rationally 
choose  to  be  inattentive,  and  he  derives  the  conditions  for  the  optimal  length  of 
inattentiveness.  MR  (2007)  conclude  that  the  assumption  of  sticky  information  can  be 
justified by the costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information (as in Reis, 2006a, 
2006b) or by appealing to the epidemiology of expectations (as in Carroll, 2003). 
While  Carroll‟s  epidemiology  model  seems  to  be  useful  for  modeling  the  U.S.  and 
European data, corresponding work for developing countries is still lacking. While Carroll‟s 
model seems to fit the data between professional forecasters and households, corresponding 
work  is  still  missing  between  professional  forecasters  and  firms.  To  the  best  of  my 
knowledge, there is no available information of firms‟ expectations. I attempt to fill this gap 
by investigating inflation expectation data from Peru for both professional forecasters and 
firm managers. 
Regarding  expectations,  there  has  been  an  increasing  interest  in  explaining  agents‟ 
inflation expectations formation process,
2 mainly inspired by the evidence against the rational 
expectations  hypothesis provided by survey expectations (Mankiw et al., 2004). Branch 
(2007)  bridges  the  sticky  information  and  heterogeneous  expectations  literatures  by 
presenting empirical evidence in favor of both model heterogeneity and limited information 
flows. Mankiw et al. (2004), Carroll (2003) and Döpke et al. (2008a) find evidence based on 
survey data supporting sticky information models. Nunes (2009b), instead, obtains empirical 
evidence against these models,
3 while Inoue et al. (2009) claim that the correlation between 
households and professional forecasters‟ expectations found in Carroll (2003) is higher if the 
consumption expenditure is considered as a proxy for inflation expectations,
4 Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2008) find that mean forecasts fail to adjust in response to structural shocks 
                                                 
2 See MR (2006, 2007) and Branch (2007). 
3 Nunes (2009a) proposes a model of expectations based on a rational forecast and on a learning component. 
That model is then used in Nunes (2009b) and the author argues that this model provides a better fit of the data. 
4 Inoue et al. (2009) claim that households with a lower level of education do not have the incentives to 
incorporate news into the report of their inflation expectations.   4 
leading  to  different  degrees  of  informational  rigidities,
5  and  Lanne et al. (2009) provide 
results favoring a simple sticky information model.
6  
Most  of  the  l iterature  focuses  on  the  diffusion  of  information  from  professional 
forecasters  to  households.  However,  models  based  on  sticky  information  assume  that 
information that is relevant to firms‟ pricing decisions is the information that diffuses slowly 
in the economy. Therefore, when choosing prices, firms may not immediately update their 
old information. The firm‟s decision is rational because of the costs associated with collecting 
updated information. The specification of inflation dynamics in this context is given by the 
sticky information Phillips curve (SIPC hereafter) in which current inflation depends not only 
on the current output gap but also on the past expectations of both current inflation and the 
growth rate of the current output gap from part of the firm.
7  
My findings support the usefulness of Carroll‟s modeling strategy for the description of 
expectation dynamics between professional forecasters and firm managers in Peru. I find that 
firm managers‟ inflation expectations adjust slowly relative to the more precise expectations 
of  professional  forecasters.  This  paper  presents  evidence  of  information  rigidity  between 
these  two  agents  at  both  the  aggregate  and  the  sector  levels  of  economic  activity.  As  a 
robustness check on my result, I use firm-level data and test different specifications of the 
model. I argue that the lag in the response of one group with respect to the other group is a 
valid approximation for the level of information rigidity in the Peruvian economy. Peru is an 
economy  with  two  high  inflation  periods  (in  1988  and  in  1992),  a  relatively  recent 
independent central bank (in 1992), and an explicit inflation target scheme (since 2002). This 
                                                 
5 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) expand the analysis to explain the “Great Moderation” on expectations and 
present evidence of state-dependence in the expectation formation process. 
6 Lanne et al. (2009) define simple sticky information as the situation in which a significant proportion of the 
households base their inflation expectations on the past release of actual inflation rather than on the rational 
forward-looking forecast. For a recent survey in the past decade on imperfect information models see MR 
(2010). 
7 Walsh (2010) shows that the conclusions of the sticky information models are sensitive to the slope of the 
Phillips curve.   5 
study  covers  a  period  of  relatively  low  inflation  and  estimates  the  transmission  of  the 
expectations between two groups of agents: financial institutions that do business based on a 
better  knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  Peruvian  economy  and  the  less  informed 
managers of firms who are the agents who set prices in the economy.
8  
The  remaining  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Part  2  introduces  the  baseline 
epidemiology  model  and  the  basis  for  information  transmission  between  two  groups: 
financial  institutions  and  firm  managers,  Part  3  presents  the  data,  methodology,  and 






2.1 The Carroll Model 
In the Carroll (2003) epidemiology model, information goes from professional forecasters 
to consumers. The dynamics of expectations are described by a model where households‟ 
views depend on news reports about professional forecasters‟ views. However, households 
are  inattentive  because  they  read  news  reports  only  occasionally.  This  particular  feature 
triggers stickiness in aggregate expectations. Following on Carroll‟s model, I assume that: (i) 
most firm managers (FMs hereafter) update their inflation expectations by reading newspaper 
articles on inflation, (ii) every article contains a complete forecast of the inflation rate for all 
future years and, (iii) each firm manager (FM hereafter) who read such article absorbs its 
content with probability  ,
9 then the following holds: 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Appendix I for a discussion of inflation, monetary policy, and inflation expectations in Peru. 
9 Additionally, any FM that reads an inflation article can recall the entire forecast and FMs that do not encounter 
an article continue to believe the last forecast they read.   6 
 
 
?? 𝜋?+1  = 𝜆?? 𝜋?+1  + (1 − 𝜆) 𝜆??−1 𝜋?+1  +  1 − 𝜆  𝜆??−2 𝜋?+1  + ⋯     (1) 
where 𝜋?+1 is the inflation rate between quarter t and quarter t+1, ?? is the aggregate price 
index in period t, then 𝜋?+1 = 𝑙?? ??+1  − 𝑙??⁡ (??), ?? 𝜋?+1  is the mean value of inflation 
expectations of FMs for quarter  t+1  during the quarter  t, and ?? 𝜋?+?  is the newspaper 
forecast printed in time t for inflation in s ≥ t. 
In period t, a fraction    of the FMs absorbs the current newspaper forecast for the next 
quarter ?? 𝜋?+? . In period t, also a fraction  1 − 𝜆  of the FMs retains the forecasts they held 
in period t-1 for the inflation rate in t+1. This is a recursive process of past forecasts of next-
period inflation. 
The assumptions about the inflation process implicit in the FMs‟ belief are: 
  The economy has an underlying “fundamental” inflation rate.  
  Future changes in the fundamental rate of inflation are unforecastable.  
  The actual inflation rate is equal to that period‟s fundamental rate plus unforecastable 
transitory inflation shocks. 
From the assumptions above, a FM believes that the inflation process is captured by the 
following processes: 
𝜋? = 𝜋?
? + 𝜀?                    (2) 
𝜋?+1
? = 𝜋?
? + 𝜂?+1                  (3) 
where 𝜀? is a transitory shock to the inflation rate in period  t while 𝜂? is the permanent 
innovation in the fundamental inflation rate 𝜋?
? in period t.
10  
The following assumptions simplify the model and make it more tractable: 
                                                 
10 The belief of FMs for the values of  beyond period t+1 and the values of  beyond period t is that they are 
unforecastable white noise variables.   7 
  For  periods  t  and  t+1,  FMs  believes  that     and     are  directly  estimated  by 
professional forecasters. 
  Expert  forecasters  develop  some  special  ability  for  forecasting  inflation  (use  of 
private information). 
FMs can rationally believe that a forecast from an expert is more accurate than  their 
adaptively  rational  forecast.  These  assumptions  also  imply  that  rather  than  containing  a 
forecast for the entire quarter-by-quarter future history of the inflation rate, the newspaper 
article contains only a forecast of the inflation rate over the next year. 
Re-defining ?? and ??, and define ?? for any s > t as follows:  
  𝜋?,? is the inflation rate between period t and s. 
  ?? 𝜋?,?  is the mean value of inflation expectations for FMs as of date t. 
  ?? 𝜋?,? is the newspaper forecast (expectation) as of date t. 
  ?? 𝜋?,?  is the FM‟s forecast (expectation) as of date t, for a FM that updates its 
view from a news report in t. 
Then, the hypothetical FM‟s expectation is that the true inflation rate over the next year is 
given by: 
𝜋?,?+4 = 𝜋?+1 + 𝜋?+2 + 𝜋?+3 + 𝜋?+4   
Using (2) and (3): 
𝜋?,?+4 = 4𝜋?+1
? + 3𝜂?+2 + 2𝜂?+3 + 𝜂?+4 + 𝜀?+1 + 𝜀?+2 + 𝜀?+3 + 𝜀?+4     (4) 
Then, the following holds for FMs‟ forecasts: 
?? 𝜀?+?  = ?? 𝜂?+?+1  for n > 0               (5) 
Applying (5) to (4): 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 4?? 𝜋?+1
?   = ?? 𝜋?,?+4
?       8 
This result implies that a FM‟s forecast of the inflation rate is equal to its forecast of the 
fundamental inflation rate. If FMs believe that the forecasts printed in the newspaper content 
the inflation process implied in (2), (3), and (4), then: 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 4?? 𝜋?+1
?   = ?? 𝜋?,?+4
?     
The  FM‟s  view  about  the  newspaper  forecast  is  that  it  contains  a  projection  of  the 
fundamental inflation rate. A FM that reads the newspaper updates its expectations to equal 
the newspaper forecast: 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = ?? 𝜋?,?+4
?   = ?? 𝜋?,?+4
?   = ?? 𝜋?,?+4    
When FMs read the newspaper, their views are updated to the forecasts printed in the 
inflation article. For  0  n , the newspaper has no information about  n t   or  1  n t  , which 
give a condition similar to (5): 
?? 𝜀?+?  = ?? 𝜂?+?+1   for n > 0              (6) 
The assumption that the changes in inflation rates beyond period t+1 are unforecastable 
implies: 
??−1 𝜋?−1,?+3  = ??−1 𝜋?,?+4                 (7) 
??−2 𝜋?−2,?+2  = ??−2 𝜋?,?+4                 (8) 
An equation similar to (1) can be written for projections of the inflation rate over the next 
year: 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝜆?? 𝜋?,?+4  + (1 − 𝜆) 𝜆??−1 𝜋?−1,?+3  + (1 − 𝜆) 𝜆??−2 𝜋?−2,?+2  + ⋯   
Taking into account the interactive term, replacing  t F  with  t N , and assuming that the 
newspaper forecast is the only source of updating information: 
 ?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝜆?? 𝜋?,?+4  + (1 − 𝜆)??−1 𝜋?,?+4  
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝜆?? 𝜋?,?+4  + (1 − 𝜆)??−1 𝜋?−1,?+3           (9)   9 
For FMs, their inflation expectations mean should be a weighted average between their 
current rational forecast and their last period‟s inflation expectations mean. Because making 
informed inflation forecasts is costly, FMs do not update their expectations instantaneously 
but occasionally. Similar to the original Carroll‟s model with households, new information 
that  appears  every  period  about  inflation  diffuses  from  expert  forecasters  to  FMs  in  the 
following epidemiological way: a fraction λ of FMs updates their inflation expectations to 
those expert forecasters while the remaining (1-λ) fraction of FMs stick to their forecasts 
made during the previous period. 
 
3. IDENTIFICATION AND DATA CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Previous to the estimation of λ in this section, I describe first the strategy for approaching 
the epidemiology model and then present some preliminary results that support this model. In 
the next section, I use these results for estimating Equation (9). 
 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
Estimating equation (9) requires an identification of data sources for firms-mean inflation 
expectations and for newspaper forecasts of inflation over the next year. The Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru conducts a monthly survey of the general managers of large firms intended to 
be representative of the Peruvian economy. One component of the survey asks the managers 
what they expect the inflation rate to be at the end of the year and during the next year. I use 
the mean inflation forecast from this survey as a proxy for ?? 𝜋?,?+4 .  
For identifying the “newspaper” forecast for next-year inflation, I use the mean next-year 
inflation forecast from the survey of financial institutions. The survey, also conducted by the 
Central Reserve Bank of Peru, has collected and summarized forecasts from leading banks,   10 
pension fund managers, and other financial institutions since 1999. The survey questionnaire 
is distributed once a month and responses are due within 10 days. The central bank asks 
participants for monthly and annual forecasts of inflation for the end of the year and the next 
year.  
Typically,  a  newspaper  article  on  inflation  includes  interviews  from  “experts”  on 
inflation, who in turn provide the reasoning behind their predictions. In this case, experts are 
those professionals who forecast the economy for a living (implying that professionals being 
interviewed by the media are the same forecasters). Those forecasts are, in turn, summarized 
by the survey to financial institutions.
11 Therefore, the indentification of ?? 𝜋?,?+4  with the 
inflation expectations data from the survey of financial institutions is a reasonable approach. 
 
3.2 Data Description 
Data about expectations are taken from the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. I use financial 
institutions‟ and general managers‟ expectations on inflation.
12 The inflation rate is computed 
as the 12-month growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).   
Figures  1  and  2  show  that  the  distribution  of  both  financial  institutions‟  and  FMs‟ 
forecasts is symmetric around a central value. Table 1 presents some summary statistics as 
well and confirms that the mean, median, and mode are similar in value. The difference in 
these three measures of central tendency is no larger than 0.6 percentage point for all years in 
the sample.  
The  cross-sectional  dispersion  of  the  FMs‟  answers  is  larger  than  the  dispersion  of 
financial  institutions‟  answers  during  all  years.  The  disagreement  or  uncertainty  about 
inflation among FMs is larger than the disagreement among financial institutions regarding 
                                                 
11 In the particular case of Peru, each financial institution has an Economic Studies department. This department 
produces a report that includes the institutions‟s views on the Economy as a whole and its expected values for 
key variables, especially at the end of each fiscal quarter. Such reports coincide with the publication of the 
firm‟s balance sheet. 
12 For details on the time series 12-months-ahead inflation expectations, see Appendix II.   11 
future inflation. Figure 3 reports the dispersion in the answers of both groups and shows that 
FMs‟ responses are more disperse.  
In Table 1, it is possible to identify that the level of disagreement increases during periods 
of relatively high inflation. For example, inflation in 2008 is the maximum level recorded for 
the sample period of analysis and the standard deviation in the forecasts of inflation for 2009 
is  almost  twice  the  previous  year‟s  dispersion.  Similar  results  hold  for  the  inter-quartile 
statistics.
13 
In Table 2, Panel A, the correlation coefficient is higher between financial institutions ‟ 
forecast and the most recent information of core inflation than it is between those forecasts 
and CPI inflation. In contrast, there is a higher correlation between FMs‟ expectations and 
CPI inflation than there is between those forecasts and core inflation. This evidence suggests 
that professional forecasters have better information than FMs about fundamental inflation 
(measured as core inflation), which is consistent with Carroll‟s (2003) model.  
Nunes (2009b) argues that households are more accurate at forecasting CPI inflation but 
not core inflation, contradicting Carroll‟s results. Nunes uses the mean squared error (MSE) 
and compares the mean and median in the household survey conducted by the University of 
Michigan and the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia. When using the median, Nunes finds that the MSE between  households‟ 
forecasts and CPI inflation  is lower than those  between  professional forecasters and CPI 
inflation. The results reverse when core inflation is considered. 
In Table 2, Panel B, I present the same test for both sample groups and both measures of 
central tendency. The financial institutions are always more accurate in their predictions, 
except in the case of median-CPI inflation. Mankiw et al. (2004) present an exercise during 
the transition of the Volcker disinflation on how the distribution of inflation expectations in 
                                                 
13 Another possibility that could explain the greater volatility of forecasts during 2008 is the crisis in the U.S. 
that affected most agents‟ expectations about inflation.   12 
households  evolves.  During  the  transition,  the  distribution  of  the  households‟  responses 
became  approximately  bi-modal.  This  fact  would  explain  the  consistency  of  my  results 
compared  to  Nunes,  because  the  distribution  of  inflation  expectations  in  my  study  is 
symmetric for the case of Peruvian FMs, which explain why the mean and median would be 
the same. 
 
3.3 Granger Causality Test 
Another potential explanation of the financial institutions‟ inflation expectations is that 
they observe FMs‟ expectations first in order to build their own expectations. It is possible to 
argue that the relationship between managers of FMs and the research department of financial 
institutions is a channel that would work in both directions. 
A way to test the suggested structure of the epidemiology model (expectations spread 
from  financial  institutions‟  research  departments  to  the  FMs)  is  to  test  that  the financial 
institutions‟ forecasts should Granger-cause the FMs‟ forecasts, but not vice versa. In Table 3 
I show that there is evidence of Granger causality from the financial institutions‟ forecasts to 
FMs‟ forecast, but no evidence of Granger causality in the opposite direction. In other words, 
the lags of financial institutions‟ expectations are typically significant predictors of FMs‟ 
expectations  but  FMs‟  expectations  tend  not  to  Granger-cause  financial  institutions‟ 




4. ESTIMATIONS AND EMPIRICS 
 
The news about inflation can be thought of as a disease that spreads slowly across the 
FMs, infecting a fraction    of all the FMs in each period. Hence Equation (9) is directly 
estimable, given that an appropriate proxy for newspaper articles on inflation expectations   13 
can be found and    can be thought as the degree of information rigidity of the expectations 
of the FMs with respect to the professional forecasters.
14 
 
4.1 Degree of Information Stickiness  
I now turn to the main question: Can the FMs‟ survey data be reasonably well represented 
by  the  reduced-form  model  represented  by  (9)?  As  Döpke  et  al.  (2008a)  point  out,  the 
underlying  time-series  properties  of  inflation  expectations  determine  the  appropriate 
empirical approach. In the case of time series that are stationary, OLS is the correct technique 
for estimating Equation (9) (as in Carroll, 2003). If this is not the case (i.e. non-stationary) 
and the time series are cointegrated, Equation (9) should be estimated with a vector error-
correction (VEC) model.
15 
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  tests  suggest  that  the  series  of  expectations  are 
stationary. For the sample period that this study covers, cointegration techniques are not 
recommended. So, taking into account the preliminary evidence from previous subsections 
that support the epidemiological model of expectations, I estimate the speed of information 
updating, captured by λ in Equation (9). 
Equation 1 of Table 4 provides a baseline for comparison and presents the result for the 
simplest possible model: FMs‟ forecasts, ?? 𝜋?,?+4 , is equal to a constant, 𝗼0. The point 
estimate of the constant is 2.6 percent, which is close to the center of the inflation band (2.5 
percent)  announced  by  the  central  bank  in  2002-2006.
16  The  parameter  is  statistically 
                                                 
14 Regarding the estimation of information rigidity, most work about sticky information uses time series 
analysis. Khan and Zhu (2006), Coibion (2010), Döpke (2008a), and Carrera (2010) use non-linear OLS for 
estimating the degree of information rigidity. Kiley (2007) employs a maximum likelihood methodology. Kiley 
(2007) also suggests that in environments of relatively low inflation, the degree of information rigidity tends to 
increase. 
15 Döpke et al. (2008a) follow Carroll‟s strategy but do not present any evidence in favor of any order of 
integration for inflation or inflation expectations. They argue that the objective of their paper is to test the 
validity of Carroll‟s epidemiology model and estimate this model using both empirical strategies. 
16 In 2007, the central bank announced a lower inflation targeting (2 percent) with the same length of band (1 
percent below and over the target).   14 
significant and, as expected, the ?  2 is equal to zero. The test performed for the benchmark 
model is whether the average value of the expectations is zero, 𝗼0 = 0. This hypothesis can 
be  rejected  with  a  high  degree  of  statistical  confidence  (the  ρ-value  indicates  that  the 
probability that the hypothesis is true is close to zero). 
I evaluate the baseline model‟s ability to explain the FMs‟ expectations by estimating an 
equation of the form: 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝗼1?? 𝜋?,?+4  + 𝗼2??−1 𝜋?−1,?+3  + 𝜀?          (10) 
where ?? 𝜋?,?+4  is the financial institutions‟ forecast. Equation (10) can be compared with 
(9) and permits testing the following restriction: 
𝗼1 + 𝗼2 = 1                    (11) 
Results from the estimation of (10) are presented as Equation 2. The point estimates of  
𝗼1 = 0.46 and  𝗼2 = 0.51 suggest  that (11) is very close to holding true. The statistical 
significance  with  which  the  restriction  (11)  can  be  rejected  is  about  0.28.  This  formal 
statistical  evidence  of  the  restriction  indicates  that  this  proposition  can  be  easily 
accommodated by the data at a level of significance of 0.05 or greater.
17 
The above results can be interpreted as a level of information rigidity of two quarters for 
the Peruvian economy;  in other words,  all  FMs  require half  a  year in order to update 
information, on average.  
The possibility that FMs update their expectations to the most recent inflation rate rather 
than to the financial institutions‟ forecast is another reasonable modification to the baseline 
model. Since most news on inflation also release the most recent inflation statistics (and since 
the inflation rate is often in the headline of the news article,) it is possible to argue that it 
                                                 
17 There is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals as indicated by the Q-stat statistic. This is an 
impressive result because the individual series have very high degrees of serial correlation. This may suggest 
that the two variables are co-integrated. The ADF results, on the other hand, suggest that these series are 
stationary. As part of the agenda of this paper, the use of cointegration techniques would be useful when more 
data are available.   15 
seems likely for FMs to update their expectations to the most recent  released number of 
inflation than to a forecast of the future inflation rate. As pointed out by Carroll, this result 
would be in line with a model of adaptive expectations.  
If  FMs  believe  that  the  true  inflation  process  follows  on  (2)  and  (3),  this  adaptive 
expectations approach is similar to the limited-information rational expectations forecast. The 
epidemiology model assumes that FMs believe that professional forecasters have the most 
information  regarding  the  inflation  process,  so  their  predictions  are  more  accurate  than 
expectations based on the past history of inflation. Therefore, FMs who update information 
could still believe that the financial institution forecast is better than the adaptively rational 
forecast. Another possible alternative is some “learning” process from the FMs; so they may 
take into account past forecast error in order to make their predictions today. 
As  suggested  in  Carroll  (2003)  and  Nunes  (2009b)  it  is  possible  to  encompass 
specifications  that  include  adaptive  and  learning  processes  i.e.  estimate  the  following 
equation: 
?? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1?? 𝜋?,?+4  + 𝗼2??−1 𝜋?−1,?+3  + 𝗼3𝜋? + 𝗼4??? 𝜋?−4,?  + 𝜀? (12) 
where  t    represents  the  most  recently  published  annual  inflation  rate  as  of  time t  and  
??? 𝜋?−4,?  is the actual forecast error. 
Results from estimating (12) are presented in the next rows of Table 4. The results in 
Equation 3 rule out the possibility that financial institutions‟ forecasts are not significant if a 
constant is added. Equation 4 takes into account the possibility that FMs consider the most 
recent inflation information rather than the forecasts of professional forecasters. In terms of 
the  model,  this  may  imply  a  prediction  of  the  fundamental  inflation  rate.  Financial 
institutions‟  forecasts  of  future  inflation  are  still  a  significant  determinant  of  the  FMs‟ 
forecasts, while actual inflation remains not significant. Similar results hold if rather than past 
inflation, the forecast error is considered, as I show in Equation 5.    16 
From Equation 6, the past inflation rates are statistically significant determinants of the 
FMs‟ expected inflation rates only when the lagged value of the FMs‟ forecast is considered. 
That is not the case for the forecast error. 
The last two rows in Table 4 show that when the financial institutions‟ predictions are 
entirely absent, the current inflation rate and the forecast error term have explanatory power 
for the FMs‟ forecast of the inflation rate.  
In the words of Carroll, it seems fair to say that the simple “sticky expectations” equation 
(9) does a good job of capturing much of the behavior of the FMs‟ inflation expectations. In 
all  the  specifications  estimated,  financial  institutions‟  expectations  are  a  significant 
determinant of the FMs‟ inflation expectations. 
 
4.2 Heterogeneous Expectations: Industry Level 
It is  also  possible that different  FMs  have different incentives  to update information, 
which in turn affects the FMs‟ expectations. A first approach would be to differentiate FMs 
according to the economic activity they perform. A similar approach of dividing the survey 
sample into sub-samples by potential different content of information can be found in Inoue 
et al. (2009).
18 
After  testing  Carroll‟s  model  per  sector,  I  find  that  the  data  still  support  the  main 
constraint of the model in Equation (11). On the other hand, as expected, the level of rigidity 
varies in between sectors. As reported in Table 5, FMs that update faster to the financial 
institutions‟ forecast are firms involved in manufacturing processes and natural resources 
extractive activities. The level of information rigidity consistent with these parameters ranges 
between one and two quarters. The sectors with the most information rigidity are trade and 
construction, with a rigidity level in a range of two and three quarters.  
                                                 
18 Inoue et al. (2009) show that household survey responses are more highly correlated with professional 
inflation forecasts if the household has highly educated consumers. Inoue et al. argue that this fact is consistent 
with the view that more educated consumers are better able to articulate their expectations.   17 
A first way to approach this result is by testing if firms belonging to one particular sector 
forecast future inflation incorrectly over time, which may bias the estimator of information 
rigidity  from the time series  approach. In Figure  4, I present  the average inflation point 
estimate and the level of information rigidity per sector. Even though there is dispersion in 
the data, such dispersion is well inside the 95 percent confidence band for the whole sample 
of firms, which supports my result. However, the dispersion suggests that the cross-sectional 
variation may give me a more robust estimator. 
Then I compare the level of information rigidity with the level of disagreement in FMs 
that  carry  out  different  economic activities.  In  Figure  5  it  is  possible  to  find  a  negative 
relationship, suggesting that in sectors in which there are more disagreements, the expected 
time for updating expectations would be higher. 
The last test I propose is to compare the level of information rigidity against a proxy for 
markup.
19 Sectors that display a higher markup are also sectors with a longer lag in updating 
information, as suggested in Figure 6.
20 
Even though there are no large variations  in point estimates, disagreements, or markup 
per industry, all these preliminary tests suggest that the cross -sectional dimension of FMs‟ 
responses has to be tested in the context of a panel data analysis. Doing so may correct any 
potential bias due to the systematic forecast error of some FMs. 
 
4.3 Heterogeneous Expectations: Firm Level 
In order to rule out any type of consistent over-(under-)predictions on the part of any 
individual  FM  (or  group  of  FMs),  which  in  turn  bias  the  results  from  the  time  series 
regression, I estimate a panel of FMs that responded at least 38 percent during the sample 
                                                 
19 I take the proportion between the excess in profits relative to the aggregate value generated per economic 
activity from the last input-output table for the Peruvian economy as a proxy for the markup on a specific 
industry. 
20 Manufacturing firms have to compete with imported products, which would explain a higher degree of 
competition and a lower markup relative to other economic activities.   18 
period.
21 The strategy is to consider any type of consistent, yet significant pattern in  FMs‟ 
answers. I estimate different fixed effect specifications to account for those patterns. The 
work of Lahiri and Liu (2006) and Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) also explore the cross-
dimension of inflation expectations at the individual forecasting level.
22 
The new baseline specification, which considers the cross-dimension at the FM level, 
following (9), is: 
??? 𝜋?,?+4  = 𝗼1?? 𝜋?,?+4  + 𝗼2???−1 𝜋?−1,?+3  + 𝜀??        (13) 
where  ] [ 4 ,  t t it M   is redefined as the forecast of inflation for FM i between t and t+4. 
The results are reported in Table 6. In Equation 1, I consider a panel model with constant 
coefficients, referring to both intercepts and slopes. This specification assumes that neither 
firm  nor  temporal  effects  are  statistically  significant.  In  Equation  2  the  panel  model  has 
constant slopes but intercepts that differ according to the cross-sectional unit (group firm). 
This specification considers the case of significant differences among FMs, i.e., allows the 
intercept to be cross-section specific and in this case differs from firm to firm; however, it 
may or may not differ over time. The type of fixed effects model in Equation 3 has constant 
slopes but intercepts that differ according to time. In this case, the model has no significant 
firm differences but might have autocorrelation owing to time-lagged temporal effects. The 
residuals of this kind of specification may have autocorrelation. In this case, the variables are 
homogeneous across the FMs. They could be similar in region or area of focus. For example, 
technological changes or national policies would lead to group-specific characteristics that 
                                                 
21 This ad hoc cut-off of FMs is intended to evaluate the responses of consistent participants in the survey. As a 
way to check robustness, I estimate the panel for a higher level of responses and the results remain the same. 
The fixed effects models frequently have too many cross-sectional units of observations requiring too many 
dummy variables for their specification. Too many dummy variables may limit the model of a sufficient number 
of degrees of freedom for adequately statistical tests and be subject to multicollinearity, which increases the 
standard errors and thereby drains the model even more of statistical power to test parameters.  
22 Even though Lahiri and Liu (2006) and Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) focus on explaining inflation 
uncertainty, using survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), they both take into account 
the cross-sectional variation in their studies. Lahiri and Liu find that the persistence in forecast uncertainty is 
much lower than what the aggregate time series data would suggest. They use a panel of density forecasts from 
the SPF. Capistrán and Timmermann show that the conditional variance of inflation, the conditional mean of the 
inflation rate, and the cross-sectional dispersion in inflation beliefs are positively related at the forecaster level.   19 
may affect temporal changes in the FMs‟ expectations. Equation 4 is another fixed effects 
panel model in which the slope coefficients are constant, but the intercept varies over firms as 
well as over time. 
Table 6 shows the results for all of these fixed effect specifications. In all of them the 
forecasts of financial institutions remain significant, with the expected sign and with values 
around  the  time  series  regression  estimation.  The  point  estimates  suggest  that  firms,  on 
average, update their information set to that of the financial institutions between 2 and 3 
quarters. Equation 1 in Table 6 shows a point estimate of 0.63, which suggests a level of 
information rigidity close to 2 quarters. The data on expectations accommodate reasonably 
well Carroll‟s epidemiology model and give a reasonable length of the degree of information 





A central topic in macroeconomics is the role of private agents‟ expectations at both the 
disaggregate and aggregate levels because a better understanding of those expectations also 
allows a better understanding of structural relationships in the economy. The recent literature 
on sticky information indicates an important role for the behavior of expectations, especially 
those  arising  from  firms.  Here,  I  present  Carroll‟s  (2003)  epidemiologic  model  of 
expectations and estimate the information rigidity between financial institutions and the FMs 
of firms using data from Peru. In this model, there is information rigidity in the sense that 
financial  institutions  devote  significant  resources  to  updating  information,  which  in  turn 
affects  their  expectations,  but  these  new  expectations  are  imperfectly  transmitted  to  the 
managers of private firms.  
Information rigidities lead a group of firms to set prices based on past information. The 
environment in which a FM operates may affect the timing at which this FM updates its   20 
information set. Moreover, heterogeneity in the timing may arise at the firm and/or industry 
level for three reasons: (i) some FMs set prices with the best information available, while 
others have no incentives to incur additional costs for updating information, which would 
lead to dispersion at the industry level (level of disagreements), (ii) some FMs face more 
competition, which lowers the markup and the incentive for managers to be more updated 
(the markup level), and/or (iii) some FMs may not have incentives to reveal the true value of 
their  expectations  on  inflation  (systematic  errors  in  forecasting).  Considering  these 
heterogeneities may give a more robust estimate of the information rigidity in the Peruvian 
economy. 
The data support the restriction suggested by Carroll‟s epidemiology model and suggest a 
level of information rigidity of half a year. I find that financial institutions‟ expectations and 
past expectations of the FMs are significant determinants of the FMs‟ expectations, result that 
is robust to different specifications. At the cross-section level, responses about expectations 
have symmetric distributions for all years, and the data suggest that at high levels of inflation, 
the level of the inflation forecast increases as well as the disagreement increases between 
agents. 
With heterogeneous FMs (i.e., FMs that belong to different industries) the epidemiologic 
model closely matches the data on FMs‟ expectations, with relatively short deviations from 
the aggregate parameter of the degree of information rigidity. This model succeeds in part 
because responses about future rates of inflation are on average close to the prediction of the 
aggregate level. I also consider the disagreement and the markup at the industry level, in 
order to be more consistent with the data along a number of dimensions. I find a negative 
relationship in both cases, which suggests a role for testing the cross-dimension in a panel 
with fixed effects. The results from different fixed effects panel data specifications confirm 
the robustness of the results found in the time series analysis.   21 
This model of transmission and expectations suggests that information frictions matter for 
understanding  certain  features  of  FMs‟  expectations.  Future  research  should  study  more 
closely  how  agents  update information  other  than  inflation.  Understanding  how  financial 
institutions‟ expectations evolve relative to rational expectations will also shed light on the 
evolution of FMs‟ expectations. Consistent with Easaw and Ghoshray (2006), it would be 
interesting to test these two groups of agents‟ expectations with different types of shocks and 
document  those  results.  Finally,  Mankiw  and  Reis  (2007)  develop  a  general  equilibrium 
model based on sticky information that replicates the level of disagreement on the household 
survey  expectations.  Estimating  the  level  of  disagreements  of  FMs  based  on  a  sticky 
information general equilibrium model would be the natural next step of this research. 
 
APPENDIX I - HIGH INFLATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
 
The Peruvian economy suffered a period of hyperinflation during 1988 and 1992, as a 
result of a combination of heterodox policies and a “low” level of institutions‟ credibility. In 
1988, there was a spiral of “bad” news followed by a shock on expectations, which resulted 
in a higher level of prices. In 1992, the high level of inflation was announced and several 
managed prices were set to free market levels, an action that first induced a period of high 
inflation,  and  lower  levels  of inflation  thereafter.  The central  government  announced  the 
independence of the central bank and since then the bank‟s main objective has been price 
stability.  
Since 2002, the Peruvian economy has experienced different structural changes regarding 
monetary policy. One of those changes was the announcement of an explicit inflation target 
of 2.5 percent with a band of 1 percent above and below.
23 Since 2007, the target has been 2.0 
percent with a band of  1 percent above and below. The other important change was the 
                                                 
23 For previous years, many authors consider the inflation target in the IMF letter of intent from Peru as the 
implicit announced target band for inflation.   22 
switch from an aggregate monetary target to an interest rate as the operative target. Figure 
A1, as suggested in Easaw and Ghoshray (2006), shows that the band of the inflation target 
“anchors” the expectations of the professional forecasters and, as implied in Capistrán and 
Ramos-Francia (2010), the dispersion of the expectations is reduced. Figure A1 also shows 
that the response of expectations to movements in inflation outside the band is asymmetric.
24  
Therefore the period 2001-2010 is considered a period of relatively low inflation (with a 
mean of 2.3 percent), low volatility (a standard deviation of 2.1) and with the historical 
record  of  deflation  on  2001  (see  Table  A1).  Regarding  expectation s,  they  are  mostly 
symmetric and unimodal in both financial institutions and managers of firms (see  again 
Figures 1 and 2). 
 
APPENDIX II – 12-MONTH EXPECTATIONS APPROXIMATION 
 
In the survey given to general managers of firms, there is no question about the 12-month 
estimate  of  the  inflation  rate  for  firms.  For  financial  institutions,  this  question  has  been 
included in the survey since June 2009. On the other hand, the central bank asks for inflation 
expectations during the current year and the next year for both samples, consistently over 
time. 
I build a time series for the 12-month expectation of inflation as the geometric average 
between the current-year forecast and the next-year prediction.
25 The weight for each year is 
proportional to the time to be forecasted. For example, the estimation of the 12-months-ahead 
inflation expected in March is: 
??𝑎?𝑐? 𝜋?/(?+1)  =  ??𝑎?𝑐? 𝜋𝐽𝑎? −??𝑐
?   
1
12∗9
 ??𝑎?𝑐? 𝜋𝐽𝑎? −??𝑐
?+1   
1
12∗3
   
                                                 
24 When contemporaneous inflation is higher than the target band, expectations for next-year inflation are higher 
and outside the band. When inflation is inside or below the band, expectations tend to be inside the target band. I 
discuss this topic further in Section 4. 
25 This approach assumes that the agents do lineal forecasts of inflation; i.e., they estimate the average inflation 
for the year and then expand to a year time period.   23 
where ??𝑎?𝑐?  𝜋
?
(?+1)     is the expected inflation in March at year t, from April at year t to 
March at year t+1 and ??𝑎?𝑐? =  𝜋𝐽𝑎? −??𝑐
?   is the expected inflation in March at year t for 
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Inflation Expectations: Summary Statistics
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Financial Institutions
Mean 4,4 2,4 2,1 2,1 2,9 2,5 2,3 2,8 4,2 2,2
Median 4,1 2,5 2,0 2,1 2,5 2,5 2,3 2,8 4,0 2,1
Mode 4,0 2,5 2,0 2,0 2,5 2,5 2,5 3,0 4,0 2,0
St. Dev. 0,9 0,7 0,4 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,6 1,0 0,4
Interquartile 0,5 1,0 0,5 0,3 0,7 0,0 0,5 0,5 1,4 0,5
Observations 24 29 28 28 28 29 27 22 20 22
Firms
Mean 2,7 2,6 2,6 3,2 2,1 1,9 2,1 4,6 2,4
Median 2,5 2,5 2,5 3,0 2,0 1,8 2,0 4,2 2,0
Mode 3,0 2,5 2,5 3,0 2,5 2,5 2,0 4,0 2,0
St. Dev. 1,5 0,9 1,4 0,9 0,8 0,5 0,9 1,6 1,3
Interquartile 1,0 1,0 0,7 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,0
Observations 318 333 338 350 338 361 340 286 284
Inflation 1/
CPI  -0,13 1,52 2,48 3,48 1,49 1,14 3,93 6,65 0,25 2,08
CPI Core  1,30 1,23 0,73 1,23 1,23 1,37 3,11 5,56 2,35 2,12
Inflation Target
Middle band 3,0 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0
Upper band 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0
Lower band 2,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
1/ Percent variation in the Index December this year with respect to December last year.









Inflation and Inflation Expectations Statistics
CPI Inflation Core Inflation
Panel A: Correlation coefficient
Financial Institutions 86% 87%
Firms 73% 71%








Granger Causality Test: FMs and Financial Institutions
Prob. 
Financial Institutions do not Granger cause firms' expectations 0.02
Firms do not Granger cause financial institutions' expectations 0.82
Table 4
Estimating and Testing for Information Rigidity
Mt[πt,t+4]=α0+α1St[πt,t+4]+α2Mt-1[πt-1,t+3]+α3πt+α4FEt[πt-4,t]+εt
Equation α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 Ř
2 Test ρ-value
1 2,60 0,00 α0=0 0,00
0,21 ***
2 0,46 0,51 0,85 α1+α2=1 0,28
0,12 *** 0,11 ***
3 -0,36 0,64 0,50 0,83
0,24 0,15 *** 0,13 ***
4 0,88 0,11 0,69
0,08 *** 0,07
5 0,97 -0,05 0,68
0,06 *** 0,06
6 0,40 0,49 0,08 0,86
0,13 *** 0,11 *** 0,04 *
7 0,45 0,52 0,03 0,85
0,14 *** 0,14 *** 0,05
8 0,77 0,18 0,78
0,06 *** 0,05 ***
9 0,95 0,08 0,73
0,03 *** 0,04 *
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance error correction.












Estimating and Testing for Information Rigidity: Industry level
Mt[πt,t+4]=α1St[πt,t+4]+α2Mt-1[πt-1,t+3]+εt
Equation α1 α2 Ř
2 Test: α1+α2=1
ρ-value
Agriculture, Fishing and Mining 0,53 0,46 0,85 0,84
0,10 *** 0,09 ***
Manufacturing 0,59 0,41 0,81 0,80
0,12 *** 0,11 ***
Trade 0,38 0,60 0,82 0,42
0,09 *** 0,08 ***
Construction 0,37 0,61 0,74 0,70
0,13 *** 0,11 ***
Energy 0,51 0,48 0,89 0,33
0,07 *** 0,07 ***
Services 0,48 0,49 0,84 0,33
0,11 *** 0,10 ***
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance error correction.
One, two, and three stars indicate, respectively, statistical significance at the the 10, 5, and 1 
percent level.
Table 6
Estimating and Testing for Information Rigidity: Firm level
Mit[πt,t+1]=α0+α1St[πt,t+1]+α2Mit-1[πt-1,t]+εit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
α0 -0.10 -0.16 -0.10
0.06 * 0.06 * 0.06
α1 0.63 0.73 0.68 0.72
0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
α2 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.36
0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 ***
Ř
2 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36
Cross section fixed effect No Yes No Yes





































Annual Rate of Inflation in the Peruvian Economy




SD 1 050,62 1,99
Interquartil range 42,28 2,34
Max 7 649,65 6,65
Min -0,13 -0,13
Max (year) 1990 2008
Min (year) 2001 2001




FIGURE 1 – DISTRIBUTION OF FMS’ EXPECTATIONS ON INFLATION 
 
 
NOTE: FMS‟  EXPECTATIONS  ARE 12-MONTHS-AHEAD  FORECAST  OF  INFLATION,  TAKEN  ON DECEMBER  OF 



































































































































NOTE: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS‟ EXPECTATIONS ARE 12-MONTHS-AHEAD FORECAST OF INFLATION, TAKEN 






























































































































FIGURE 3 – BOX PLOT OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 
A: FMS’ EXPECTATIONS 
 
 












































FIGURE 4 – INFORMATION STICKINESS AND EXPECTATIONS: INDUSTRY LEVEL 
 
 







FIGURE 5 – INFORMATION STICKINESS AND DISAGREEMENTS: INDUSTRY LEVEL 
 
 









































































Agriculture, Fishing and Mining
Services




FIGURE 6 – INFORMATION STICKINESS AND MARKUP: INDUSTRY LEVEL 
 
 
NOTE:  MARKUP  IS  THE  RATIO  BETWEEN  THE  EXCESS  IN  PROFITS  RELATIVE  TO  THE  AGGREGATE  VALUE 






















































Agriculture, Fishing, Mining  34 
FIGURE 1A – INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND INFLATION TARGETING 
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NOTE: EXPECTATIONS  ARE  12-MONTHS-AHEAD  FORECAST  OF  INFLATION  FROM  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS, 
TAKEN ON DECEMBER OF EACH YEAR. THE DARK LINES ARE THE INFLATION TARGETING BAND. THE LIGHT 
LINE IS THE REALIZATION OF CPI INFLATION. VALUES OF INFLATION FOR 2001 AND 2008 ARE NOT GRHAPED 
BECAUSE THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF THE HISTOGRAM. THE INTERVALS ARE ADJUSTED EACH TIME THE 
CENTRAL  BANK  CHANGED  THE  INFLATION  TARGET  SO  EACH  INTERVAL  CONSIDERS  RESPONSES  THAT  ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH THE BAND ANNOUNCED FOR THE CENTRAL BANK.  
 